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This article attempts to do two things. First, to suggest that the way in which we 
define  progress is severely lacking as it is associated primarily with material accumu-
lation, self-interest and the freedom to compete with others.  Such a limited notion of 
progress is reliant upon an equally narrow understanding of the individual. Thus, it 
is important to both recognize and to challenge the ideological foundations of these
connections which limit the very way a developed society is defined. The second task 
is to put forth an alternative meaning of progress, drawing on feminist theories of 
Care as well as practices of motherwork, which capture important aspects of the hu-
man experience that go beyond narrow economic concerns. In this way it is possible 
to re-imagine what the individual is and what a truly developed society could look 
like. An alternative expression of the individual and progress is thus necessary to 
create and sustain a different kind of world.
What often goes unquestioned in the analyses of the political and economic 
systems of industrialized countries is the way in which progress is defined. 
That is, the “good life” is defined primarily by the accumulation of material 
goods with the accompanying over-inflation of the importance of self-interest. 
This, I would argue, is an impoverished understanding of what it means to be a 
“developed” society and what constitutes “progress.” In this paper, I present an 
alternative view that identifies and incorporates aspects of human experience 
that go beyond narrow economic concerns. To do so, I draw on feminist theories 
of care which question the gender-neutral notion of the rational actor (Ferber 
and Nelson, 1993) and challenge the idea that a “developed” society is one in 
which economic growth, accumulation, efficiency and profit maximization are 
all that matter. A feminist interpretation based on theories of care and practices 
of motherwork, provide a way to re-imagine what a society could look like, 
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transforming the very way in which we define what a developed society should 
be. In particular, we need to move beyond the limited and unchallenged no-
tion—which dictates social life as well as policy formation in both the First and 
Third Worlds—that development is strictly an economic concept. In my view, 
such a critical challenge will be useful for scholars, practitioners and activists 
alike—who are striving to create and sustain a caring global society. 
Feminist theories on care: Care as ethic, virtue, value, experience, 
and practice
Joan Tronto’s Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care 
(1993), offers a very useful elaboration of care. She and Berenice Fisher define 
caring as
a species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, 
continue and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as 
possible. That world includes our bodies, our selves and our environ-
ment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining 
web. (103)
Included in this concept of care are four elements. First, care and care 
activities are not restricted to interpersonal connections since a person could 
care for herself, her work, hobbies, pets, or the environment. Second, caring 
is not necessarily dyadic or individualistic, but social. Third, although care is 
a universal need, specific needs vary across cultures and throughout history. 
Finally, care is both a single activity (an outcome or a product) and an ongo-
ing process. 
Care is both rational and emotional, uniting feeling, thought and action. 
Sara Ruddick (1989) argues that maternal care is “an ongoing, organized set 
of activities that require discipline and active attention” (50). Barbara Katz 
Rothman (1989) and Adrienne Rich (1986) urge us to think of motherhood 
and caring as experiences, existing within particular ideological and institu-
tional constructions. Virginia Held (2006) writes that care is not simply the 
work involved, but it is indeed a practice. The example she gives is chopping 
down a tree to fell it. In whatever way one does this, it is work. But doing so 
effectively becomes a practice. Thus, care is more than the labour itself, it is a 
practice (37). In different ways these theorists view care as both labour and 
experience, demanding self-reflection, rational thought as well as emotional 
attention, characteristics that are not merely “productive.” 
In sum, I identify care as a feminist ethic, virtue, value, experience, and 
practice. Care demands a revaluing of what has been marginalized and devalued 
by patriarchal capitalism—not because women are assumed to be naturally bet-
ter at caring practices, or even because care has evolved in the private sphere of 
women. Care challenges what has come to be considered virtuous: individuality, 
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efficiency, rationality, and autonomy, reminding us that such socially identified 
virtues are only possible through good, supported care practices. Care insists 
on interdependency and affective and emotive responses. And it does so by 
placing societal expectations equally on men and women, rich and poor to 
engage, initiate, and incorporate care and care activities as central principles 
and practices of social life. 
Human flourishing and the Political  Culture of Care
A pretext for a caring society begins with the notion of “human flourish-
ing.” Human flourishing, a term borrowed from Aristotle (1980), comes from 
the concept of eudaimonia, literally meaning “having a good guardian spirit,” 
which is central to living a good, virtuous life. In classic terms, a flourishing life 
consisted of pleasure, honour, and virtue, all of which come out of habit—of 
doing and of action. To enhance Aristotle’s notion of flourishing, I incorporate 
Karl Marx’s (1978) concept of species-being, which is related to the notion of 
individual potential, whereby individuals are capable of conscious, imaginative 
thought and action. Human flourishing requires that the individual has the 
access to and helps create and sustain the institutional structures embedded 
in a culture which supports one to advance in ways that are healthy for the 
self, family, community and society at large. Human flourishing embraces the 
full range of individual and collective values that are part of living a good and 
healthy life. Of the many maternal practices that Sara Ruddick discusses in 
her work, is “fostering growth,” which is “nurturing a child’s developing spirit” 
(Ruddick 1989: 82), an essential aspect of motherwork that allows for human 
flourishing. 
I argue that human flourishing requires a “Political Culture of Care.” The 
Political Culture of Care is a political, economic, social and moral “way of 
life.” It is a set of values and norms operating ideologically and institution-
ally, which express a version of “development” of the individual predicated 
on the development of all individuals. It counters the prevailing development 
ethic, based on a zero-sum calculation, that fosters hyper-individuality and 
competition, and is supported by masculine-derived notions of the autono-
mous individual. In this way, care is more than labour, more than practice, 
more than an ethic or moral standpoint—it is a way of life, a way of thinking 
about what individuals do and what individuals need and how these needs 
are met, day to day. 
The Political Culture of Care challenges us to see caring labour in practi-
cal, non-idealistic terms allowing us to examine and appreciate the everyday 
reproductive labour and practices associated with caregiving. Although many 
purport to value care, there is a tendency to do so merely in idealistic and sen-
timental terms—e.g., the care of a mother for a child, the care of the family, 
the caring for others during holidays or disasters. This process of idealization 
actually devalues care and care-giving, and mystifies our understanding of how 
each operate at the everyday level. Tronto (1993) suggests that we can overcome 
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this problem by paying more attention to the power dimensions underlying 
how care labour operates. By not noticing the importance and significance of 
care and care labour, people of privilege—those usually cared for—are able to 
devalue activities of care and those who give care, thereby maintaining their 
privilege. For Tronto, where care is devalued and contained, it poses no threat 
to how we construct the social order. Thus, in a Political Culture of Care, the 
power dimensions that undergird our care practices are recognized and social 
policy is created based upon attempts to dismantle the persistent inequalities 
of these care relations. 
Thus, a fundamental aspect of a Political Culture of Care is the promotion 
of equality and interdependency. That is, care as a dominant ethic, value, and 
valued set of practices would enable social beings to make choices and increase 
the options from which to choose. In a Political Culture of Care, where car-
ing practices are expected from men and women, male privilege in the public 
and private spheres would erode. If men and women alike were expected 
and encouraged to carry out the necessary reproductive labour—activities as 
diverse as child-care and gathering fuel—the oppressive sexual division of 
labour found throughout many societies would be dramatically transformed, 
enabling true human flourishing to emerge. As Mona Harrington (1999) 
has stated, “to assure good care to all members of the society should become 
a primary principle of our common life, along with the assurance of liberty, 
equality, and justice” (48)
In a society dominated by a Political Culture of Care, social beings would 
meet one another not as isolated competitive entities, but as interdependent 
and relational beings, each of whom understands that everyone at some points 
in life inevitably need the care of others. There is a consciousness and recog-
nition that some in society will require more care than others, more of the 
time. Martha Fineman (2004) unpacks the myths surrounding “autonomy,” 
“independence” and “self-sufficiency” which mask the fact that individuals 
have progressed and societies have developed only through their relations with 
others—whether the family, community, the state, or the market. Despite the 
rhetoric of “self-sufficiency,” much of the economic success that exists in the 
marketplace requires the unpaid, invisible care labour that is carried out in 
the family, as well as the resources and benefits provided by the state. 
Fineman calls for instead, a “collective responsibility for dependency,” 
which recognizes the inevitability of everyone’s need to be cared for or to care 
for someone else, both roles necessitating a dependent relationship. For those 
who are “cared for,” one is dependent upon the care labour of those giving care, 
and those who are caring for others are dependent upon societal institutions 
and resources that make quality care possible. Thus, for Fineman (2004), a 
necessary precondition for the realization of substantive equality is through 
ensuring that the care labour and practices that currently exist in the unpaid 
private family or the low-paid privatized market be adequately supported by 
the state. She writes, 
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Some robust version of substantive equality is essential in a society 
that imposes on its individuals an expectation that they can attain 
a degree of self-sufficiency as adults. In order to eventually develop 
competency to the fullest extent possible, an individual during her 
or his formative stages of life must have access to basic material and 
social resources. The assurance of some fundamental level of economic 
security guaranteed to all caretaking units in which such individuals 
are nurtured would be foundational in this regard. The state must 
subsidize caretaking just as it does other socially productive labour: 
It is the articulation of this aspiration for substantive equality that 
is the first step in building a politics to demand it. (275)
As Fineman (2004) and others have argued, it is only the state that can 
distribute these needs justly and equitably. It is the state, and not the market, 
that must define the rights and responsibilities of its members, carry out the 
conditions of equality, and can mediate the inequalities produced by the free 
market system (Fineman 2004: 264). The market cannot do this alone, as its 
principles of profit maximization and cost reduction often are used to supplant 
all other concerns.
The state’s role in securing these basic needs is vital for a Political Cul-
ture of Care to emerge because true autonomy—a pre-condition for human 
flourishing—cannot exist without them. As Fineman writes, 
Autonomy is only possible when one is in a position to be able to share 
in society’s benefits and burdens. And sharing in benefits and burdens 
can only occur when individuals have the basic resources that enable 
them to act in ways that are consistent with the tasks and expectations 
imposed upon them by the society in which they live. (29)
She continues that “[t]he expectations that one should achieve this form 
of autonomy—autonomy supported by a societal commitment for the provi-
sion of basic social needs—should be every person’s birthright. Autonomy in 
this sense concedes that there is an inherent dependence on society on the 
part of all individuals” (Fineman 2004: 29-30). Fineman affirms that it is the 
state’s role to respond to dependency and that this is justified because it is 
“fundamentally society preserving” (48).
Without aggregate caretaking there could be no society, so we might 
say that it is caretaking labour that produces and reproduces society. 
Caretaking labour provides the citizens, the workers, the voters, the 
consumers, the students and others who populate society and its 
institutions…. The fact that biological dependency is inherent in the 
human condition means that it is of collective or societal concern. 
(Fineman 2004: 48)
38         Volume 10, Number 1
Robin G. Isserles
Furthermore, care becomes one of the primary ways in which we meet one 
another as moral beings. Such an ethic relies on particular virtues of care, in par-
ticular, attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect. (Tronto 1993; Ruddick 1989; 
Held 2006; Engster 2005). A Political Culture of Care includes redefining the 
individual as a social being, interdependent with others and connected to those 
of future generations. In doing so, it transgresses the sanctity of the individual 
as embodied in mainstream economic and political theory underlying much of 
the social policy of the United States as well as in the development policy in 
the Third World. Yet, it is actually more consistent with the experiences that 
all human beings have in the course of their lives. Care is a universal need, and 
so is necessary for human flourishing. A tempered individuality where care 
predominates could help to bring about a more humane, caring world. 
Thus, a carefully and fully constructed theory and practice of care provides 
a critical reconstitution of how we define what is a developed society. As a 
counter to the hegemony of the rational actor market-driven model, a Political 
Culture of Care would operate at the level of ideology, framing our thoughts and 
ideas, and translating them into certain political, economic, moral, and cultural 
practices. This would occur at the macro level of major societal institutions as 
well as the micro level of the every day life of social beings. Thus, it is not only 
necessary to reconsider the fundamental ideas, but to alter the ideological and 
structural premises upon which policy is generated, which would reflect new 
and more humane visions of progress.
Care practices can have important consequences for social life. Speak-
ing particularly of a redefined motherhood, Barbara Katz Rothman (1989) 
suggests: 
We can focus on nurturance, caring, human relations. We can come 
to accept and to respect a wider variety of family relationships and 
arrangements. Those qualities we have come to think of as maternal 
could become more widely shared, by both men and women. We could 
direct this nurturance, this maternal caring, not just to children, but 
to each other. That is, I suppose, the fantasy, the truly revolutionary 
potential of a recreated motherhood. (23)
As this passage highlights, the practice of caring may affect the way we 
organize social life, and help us cease glorifying rigid independence, efficiency, 
bottom line costs and benefits. Throughout society, we would rebuild institu-
tions and workplace practices to reflect a Political Culture of Care, a culture 
that would in turn sustain these institutions. Ultimately, such a culture would 
affect and reflect our very notions and make possible a truly caring society
The Political Culture of Care and motherwork
We are perhaps most able to see the symbolic and real manifestations of 
a Political Culture of Care through the every day practices of mothering. I 
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use the term “Motherwork” to recognize the multitude of mothering practices, 
experiences, and self-definitions that are indeed historically and culturally bound 
(Collins 2000; Hart 2002). Mechthild Hart (2002) uses the term motherwork 
because it makes central the labour of mothering—it is life affirming work, that 
is unrecognized, unpaid, but life sustaining, what Hart refers to as “subsistence 
work.” Whether it is breast or bottle-feeding a newborn, holding and soothing 
a crying toddler, or organizing and mobilizing around environmental justice 
issues, these are just some examples of the physical, emotional, and mental work 
of mothering. While my point here is not to idealize mothering or the work that 
mothers do, I focus on these renderings of motherwork in order to capture some 
of the values, virtues, experiences and practices embodied in a Political Culture 
of Care. For example, when one is engaged in motherwork, one is recognizing 
and being attentive to the needs of another. Motherwork entails supporting, 
nurturing, and helping others to grow and flourish. Moreover, motherwork 
requires interdependency, as well as it fosters the importance of interdependent 
relations, as the community othermothers discussed in Patricia Hill Collins 
(2000). Certainly, caring practices go beyond motherwork and include a variety 
of social relationships—nursing, teaching, friendship, to name a few. I think a 
careful consideration of motherwork helps to highlight the everyday practices 
as well as the societal institutions of a Political Culture of Care.
Many recent books have been written on the complexities and contradictions 
of mothering, especially for working, middle and upper middle class women 
in the United States (Thurer, 1994; Hays, 1998; Crittenden, 2001; Douglas 
and Michaels, 2004; Warner, 2005; Blades and Rowe-Finkbeiner, 2006). 
These are just a few important political, economic, and cultural critiques of 
the contradictions between the idealization of mothers and mothering and the 
realities of mothering in a political culture where there is so little real respect 
and support given to the difficult, rewarding, pleasurable and frustrating work 
of mothering. As Hart (2002) reminds us too, such an understanding must also 
take into account those at the other end of the socio-economic class structure. 
For Hart, motherwork is “sustaining and affirming life in a social context that 
directly disaffirms life, both psychologically and physically/materially” (Hart, 
2002: 2)
The Political Culture of Care derives its meanings from the practices and 
values of motherwork. But at the same time, it could potentially transform 
the practices, experiences, and values of motherwork. So, then, what could 
motherwork look like in a Political Culture of Care? What would it mean 
for those who carry out motherwork and the society in which it is practiced 
to elevate the value of mothering without idealizing it? Where practices so 
central and essential to the human experience could be supported institution-
ally, politically, economically, and culturally, and be in the forefront of what is 
considered virtuous? What would it do to our collective spirit to see mothers 
nurse their children in public spaces without fear of reprobation or legal action? 
What would it do for those engaged in motherwork if there were institutional 
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support and cultural approval to make better, more informed decisions on how 
best to feed a newborn child in one’s circumstances? And how might we change 
the circumstances so that mothers have more freedom to choose how to best 
engage in motherwork? How would our moral obligations to each other be 
altered, in fact, improved, if all parents were extended the financial and insti-
tutional support to care for their newborns or newly adopted children for the 
first year of their lives? Or if all parents were able to nurture their children in 
healthy and safe environments?
The Political Culture of Care rejects the notion that profit maximization 
alone represents progress. Accordingly, it demands that development and 
progress embrace fundamental aspects of life that are often overlooked, or 
disavowed, in societies focused on economic development—such as environ-
mental justice, preventative health care, life-long access to quality education, 
worker-safety and flexibility, the promotion of the public good and active 
participation in community life. Such societal institutions would profoundly 
alter the experiences and practices of motherwork as well as other activities 
and experiences relating to care. 
The Political Culture of Care insists upon vigilance in fulfilling the sub-
stantive ideals of democracy, freedom and equality, ever-challenging current 
social inequalities, and working to eradicate “privilege” based on culturally 
constructed categories, whether class, race, gender, nationality, citizenship, 
physical ability, education level, or occupation. In a Political Culture of Care, 
there would be a willingness to embrace difference, and a commitment to a 
prevailing Care ethic that considers individual interests and desires in relation 
to the interests and desires of the broader community. Again, the possibilities 
this creates for improving the conditions under which motherwork occurs 
are important—as examples, the active participation of men in motherwork, 
and those who are paid to do motherwork be compensated justly, treated 
with respect, thus enabling them to care for their own children in the ways 
they would like. 
An important component of a Political Culture of Care is the recognition 
of the indispensable role of the State in providing basic material needs, such as 
clean water and air, safe shelter, nutritional food, access to land, basic education 
and literacy, health care, and freedom from violence. These needs are often 
presumed to be lacking only in the developing world, though they are not just 
Third World problems. To the extent any society is failing to meet these basic 
needs, human flourishing cannot emerge, and most certainly motherwork is 
constrained by these deficiencies. 
It does seem as if that these “caring” policies and the ideas they uphold 
have all been lost in the current American political culture as well as other 
places where such policies have been stronger. The market has triumphed as the 
widely accepted arbiter of fairness. It is the State that is seen as “inefficient” or 
discriminatory, rather than the market. In fact, the market, released from the 
regulatory chains of government, is viewed as the only societal institution that 
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can distribute the goods, services and resources that are produced by society 
equally and fairly. And this idea is predicated on the autonomous individual, 
which despite Fineman’s illumination of its mythological construct, is over-
whelming in much of neo-liberal political and economic thinking. 
However, there have been some recent empirical studies that undermine 
the widespread ideological commitment to the rational actor model, and its 
opposition to active State involvement in the provision of basic human needs. 
For example, Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers (2003) undertake a cross-
country comparative analysis of family policies among 12 countries. In doing 
so, they show very clearly how the lack of state involvement in universalizing 
workplace policies such as child care and pre-school, parental leave, paid vaca-
tion time, and proportionate part-time pay have negatively affected the overall 
well-being of children, families and adult individuals. They find that when 
compared to Canada and several European countries, the United States has 
higher rates of family and child poverty, higher rates of families without any 
or inadequate health care, and higher rates of teen pregnancy. Furthermore, 
many Americans experience other failures such as a parental time squeeze, wage 
losses for part time work, gender inequality in the labour market and the home, 
and non-standard working time. All of these experiences are interrelated and 
very much an outgrowth of the historical and exclusive privatization of care 
labour in the United States. 
To address these concerns, Gornick and Meyers (2003) call for the 
creation of a “Dual Earner/Dual Carer” society. In such a society, both men 
and women would be equally and actively engaged in paid workforce labour 
as well as the necessary unpaid home labour, which includes family care. In 
addition, there would be societal and institutional support for substantial 
parental time to care for the very young. What this would entail, certainly 
for the United States, is an expansion of the State to provide for the insti-
tutional framework in the marketplace and the family. It would be the State 
that would provide a subsidized, universal pre-school for children between 
three to five years old, as is practiced in other industrialized countries. Major 
transformations in the workplace would be instituted whereby women and 
men would be expected to reduce work hours during years when care-giving 
demands are high, such as the early years of childhood (0-3 years) or the need 
to give care to elderly parents. 
To be sure, incorporation of these ideas into the current political culture 
in the United States—with its strong ideological commitment to the free 
market—will not be easy. But there are reasons to be hopeful. First, there is 
the possibility that real policy change can transform practices and behaviors, 
which can then alter the culture that embodies these practices. As Gornick 
and Meyers (2003) write, 
Policies that support parents’ choice to reduce working hours when 
their children are very young, for example, signal the value of care-
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giving work; policies that support this choice by fathers and moth-
ers signal the equal rights and responsibilities for men and women; 
policies that socialize the cost of substitute child care signal a shared 
commitment to the well-being of children. (100)
Moreover, even in the existing political culture of the United States, a 
collective caring of others has occurred historically. As Hart (2002) writes, 
“Norms and values grounded in a belief in collective responsibilities and an 
established web of reciprocal obligations all carry the work of social mother-
hood or community caretaking” (175). There are many examples of this type 
of motherwork, especially among economically and socially disadvantaged 
women. The ideological foundations of Care as a central component of a just 
and developed society is already found in many places, as the motherwork 
experiences of poor women have demonstrated. 
Perhaps the popularity of the slogan “It takes a village to raise a child” 
(though often attributed to United States Senator and 2008 Democratic 
Presidential candidate Hilary Rodham Clinton, this slogan comes from an 
African proverb) suggests an underlying preference for such notions of col-
lective responsibility to care. It is possible that this desire is created by the 
hyper-individualist capitalist culture and practice that supports the current 
political economic system. 
A Political Culture of Care would encourage such impulses to thrive rather 
than be relegated to merely rhetorical claims that perpetuate the status quo. 
The institutional arrangements of a dual earner/dual carer society, for example, 
would allow individuals the opportunities to pursue their interests and talents 
and flourish, and be supported ideologically by a valuation of care—as a work 
activity, as an experience and practice central to our lives. Such examples by 
no means encompass all that could be changed in order to create a Political 
Culture of Care, and to promote human flourishing. 
There are many more avenues for policy formation that require attention. 
The main point is that, in order to create the pre-conditions for a truly caring 
society, the whole gamut of global social, economic and political policies, as 
well as the ideological assumptions that sustain them must be challenged. The 
Political Culture of Care, which demands that re-thinking, and the implemen-
tation of policies to foster human flourishing, is thus an indispensable part of 
promoting democracy and social justice. 
 Concluding thoughts
The basic tenet of a Political Culture of Care is that care matters as much as, 
if not more than efficiency and economic growth. A truly caring society aims at 
qualitative human flourishing—a concept that embraces the totality of policies 
and practices that define the “good life.” That does not mean that economic 
considerations are irrelevant— it is true that humans have basic material needs 
that require a stable level of economic productivity. What is not necessary, 
however, is this “peculiar attachment” to economic growth that excludes other 
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elements that connote a “developed society” and “progress.” Economic growth 
is a necessary but not sufficient component of “the good life.”
A focus on motherwork, I argue, is a helpful lens through which to 
re-examine the notions of progress that are upheld. For one, we can look at 
how our current political culture subverts motherwork. Likewise, a focus on 
motherwork helps us to see what other human experiences could and should 
be paramount in our definitions of what society should be like. In doing so, 
we can construct a different set of expectations that take us beyond economic 
growth and accumulation, challenging the orthodox paradigm of the rational 
actor and its related free market ideologies. At the same time we could rethink 
the assumptions about the individual, of what individuals need, and what makes 
life meaningful for individuals. Thus, making motherwork a central focus of 
analysis, would alter our way of thinking, our consciousness, our ethics, and our 
ideologies thereby, transforming our very notions of what a developed society 
is and what progress should be. That is what the Political Culture of Care aims 
to do. It is only with the aid of such a theory that a liberated motherwork, 
which makes possible human flourishing, that a truly caring society becomes 
an attainable and sustainable reality. 
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